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Moral conversion is a favorite and much desired theme in almost 
any kind of narrative. Consider the many “change of heart” stories 
(“change of heart” being another name for moral conversion) that 
populate the big and the small screen: the cynical pennycounter that 
becomes a warm-hearted boss and philanthropist, Dickens’s Scrooge 
in his various incarnations; the workaholic father that after a crisis 
of some sort opts for a less frantic lifestyle; the fast-paced broker 
becoming a small-league trainer; odd couples becoming lifelong friends; 
the popular, fashion-focused teen disengaging from her exclusive clique 
and opening up to systematically excluded potential friendships, the 
cowardly bystander standing up to support the hero or heroine, and so 
forth. These and other stories are the bread-and-butter of mainstream 
and independent drama and comedy alike and are at least an expected 
subplot in stories that focus on action or suspense. Tragedies too, both 
classical and contemporary, are constructed around this theme also, 
though commonly they focus on this process becoming frustrated: 
Creon, refusing to listen to his son, his people, and the voice of the gods, 
or Macbeth cowering at the sight of blood and ghosts but continuing on 
his murderous, self-destructive course.
More importantly, moral conversion is an important element of 
1 This paper is a much shortened version of the fifth chapter in my dissertation 
Narratives of Hope: A Philosophical Study of Moral Conversion (Loyola University, 
Chicago, 2008). The wording is in many cases identical, although the corresponding 
chapter investigates the topic in greater detail and explores many more cases. This paper 
was discussed during the afternoon workshop on Moral Conversion, at the 36th Annual 




real moral experience, whether as a process that actually takes place, 
or in the form of hope for change in oneself or others. The hope for 
moral conversion is sufficiently common in everyday experience to 
require little proof of its presence: it is the reason, for good or ill, why 
people continue to put their trust on those who have disappointed them 
already, perhaps more than once. Whether moral conversion actually 
takes place requires, however, some form of demonstration; and this is 
one of the goals that this papers attempts to achieve. 
Since moral conversion is such a frequent element in narratives, 
and arguably also an important element in moral experience, it is 
somewhat surprising that it has received so little attention from 
philosophers, as well as from other disciplines that study moral life.2 
This may be partially explained by the fact that moral conversion 
is constitutively a surprising event, surprising in many senses. It is 
surprising, first, in the sense that it often takes place without anyone 
expecting it, not even the subject of conversion him/herself. It is 
also surprising in the sense that, even when expected or desired, its 
outcome is uncertain, and its taking place brings a joyful amount of 
surprise for those that desire it. It defies, in other words, prediction, 
whether this be the kind of prediction originated in the methodological 
observation of patterns of probability, or the everyday prediction of 
experienced people who have seen it happen many times – and thus 
moral conversion is not normally discussed, for example, in empirically 
based analyses of moral development. This quality makes it somewhat 
of an unwieldy topic.
The difficulty in satisfactorily circumscribing the notion of moral 
2 The notion of “moral conversion” appeared very rarely in the literature, until it was 
discussed in the past century by Bernard Lonergan, in the context of the triad intellectual, 
moral, and religious conversion. This produced as a result a renewed philosophical and 
theological interest in conversion, and the resulting scholarship produced most of the 
literature available now that deals specifically with moral conversion. Even so, such 
literature is very scarce, since Lonergan scholars have focused mostly on the analysis 
of intellectual and religious conversion, and only sporadically dedicated more than 
passing reflections to it. Walter Conn, to whom I am thankful, is probably the scholar 
that has devoted most time to its study, devoting to it a couple of chapters in Christian 
Conversion: A Developmental Interpretation of Autonomy and Surrender (New York: 
Paulist Press, 1986); but the notion of moral conversion he works on is developed from 
a very specifically Lonerganian context, and as such it is not broad enough to include 
various classes of moral conversion that need to be considered for a more substantial 
treatment.
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conversion adds to this unwieldiness. The principal objective of this 
paper is to establish a typology of moral conversion, one that will serve 
additionally to define what is meant by “moral conversion” in a way 
that is both specific enough to make it susceptible of philosophical 
analysis, and inclusive enough to honor the notorious diversity of ways 
in which human life can be affected by moral conversion.3
The Notion of “Conversion”
Conversion has most frequently been studied within the realms of 
theology and religious studies (or, within the realm of psychology, as a 
subtopic within the larger topic of psychology of religious phenomena), 
and as a consequence conversion is frequently understood to mean 
religious conversion. The meaning of the term, however, is far broader. 
Intellectual, moral, affective, psychological, aesthetic, social types of 
conversion have been identified by those having these experiences, and 
by scholars who have studied them. Possibly the list could be expanded 
to include further types.4
On a first look, the common element among these notions seems 
to be some form of change in the person. This change is of tremendous 
importance to the person, in the sense that the relations of the person 
to the world, to others, to truth, even to the self are fundamentally 
affected. How the person is affected, and in respect to which aspect of 
the person’s relation to the world, to others, to truth or to self is what 
identifies the type of conversion involved. 
3 This categorization, it is hoped, will help jump-start a discussion that has been lately 
mostly abandoned. A reason for this abandonment, I believe, is precisely the absence of 
a proper categorization/definition of moral conversion. Many profound definitions have 
been put forward; Lonergan’s “a move from the criterion of satisfaction to the criterion 
of value” is a good example (Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology, 2nd. ed. [New York: 
Herder and Herder, 1973; reprint, 1994 by University of Toronto Press], 240). But these 
definitions often operate within complex universes of meaning that need to be grasped 
before the definition entirely makes sense, and that are not sufficiently inclusive. 
The present typology operates at a more basic level, categorizing moral conversion in 
terms that do not require the previous understanding of (nor agreement to) a specific, 
sophisticate analysis of moral life.
4 The key texts for conversion in Lonergan are in Method in Theology, 237-43. A very 
detailed analysis of the evolution of the notion of conversion in Lonergan can be found in 
Michael L. Rende, Lonergan on Conversion: The Development of a Notion (Lanham, MD: 
University Press of America, 1991).
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I propose to use the term “existential” as a key way of characterizing 
the kind of change that conversion constitutes.5 The term “existential” 
is itself difficult to pin down precisely, given how it is used in widely 
different contexts – and sometimes rather loosely – in contemporary 
philosophy; but it captures very adequately in its general meaning 
some essential characters of conversion. It draws attention to the 
importance of the change (as in expressions such as “she made an 
existential decision”). It draws attention to something being real and 
concrete, as opposed to something being “merely academic,” detachedly 
theoretical, and so forth. It has, in third place, the connotation of 
something being personal – in contrast, for example, to structural 
changes happening to institutions, to the restructuring of systems of 
law, to the training of animals, not to mention material changes in 
physical structures. In fourth place, it can be used to emphasize the 
contingency of the concrete: the fact that things happen that are not 
planned, plans fail, accidents occur, and contingency in general cannot 
be excluded from human existence by any amount of rational planning. 
This connotation of the term “existential” also applies to conversion, 
insofar as conversions typically have an element of unexpectedness, 
even of working against expectations. Lastly, the term “existential” 
brings forth that emphasis, so dear to the philosophical tradition named 
precisely “existentialism,” on freedom, and specifically on freedom as a 
harsh blessing. The existentialists’ discussions of freedom provide a 
suitable platform for examining the issue of whether conversion is an 
event that requires the freedom of the human agent to take place at all.
It can be seen thus why it would be useful to define conversion as 
an existential change. It is not the intention of this paper, however, to 
defend this characterization; it is proposed here only as an introductory 
approach to the meaning of the notion. A proper discussion of the 
adequacy of this characterization would have to follow a more basic 
5 The idea for this use of the term “existential” is based on a discussion between Walter 
Conn and John Gibbs regarding whether Kohlberg’s postconventional stages of moral 
reasoning are reached through a “natural/spontaneous” dynamism or an “existential” 
one, the latter requiring explicit conscious awareness on the part of the agent. See 
Conn, Christian Conversion, 107-34; John C. Gibbs, “Kohlberg’s Stages of Moral 
Development: A Constructive Critique,” Harvard Educational Review 47, no. 1 (1977); 
Alfredo MacLaughlin, Narratives of Hope: A Philosophical Study of Moral Conversion 
(Ph.D. Diss., Loyola University Chicago, 2008; available from http://www.proquest.com, 
publication number AAT 3332357), 205-27.
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circumscription of the term, which is what is attempted below.6
Toward a Notion of Moral Conversion
The typology presented in this paper is structured on the basis 
of two distinctions, that are then cross-related. These are briefly 
presented here in order to make the subsequent exposition clearer. The 
first distinction concerns the different focus given to the question about 
the meaning of morality by classical and by modern/contemporary 
philosophy. While the modern/contemporary investigations on ethical 
theory have focused strongly on the question on right and wrong, there 
is a classical understanding of the subject-matter of ethical theory 
(common to both Plato, Aristotle, and Christian medieval philosophers) 
that focuses rather on the question for happiness and “the good life” 
(contemporarily phrased also as “the meaning of life” question). In 
principle, both provide acceptable – if incomplete - ways of answering 
the question about what constitutes a matter of moral concern, and 
consequently, what differentiates moral conversion from other types of 
conversion. Collapsing both meanings, however, can only be attempted 
at the cost of much confusion, or by a highly elaborate moral theory that 
may or may not succeed in bringing both together in satisfactory ways. 
I will therefore address these two meanings of morality separately.
The second distinction concerns the meaning of conversion itself. 
A closer look at the phenomenon shows that its manifestations can 
be enormously varied, rendering a definition aimed at covering all or 
nearly all instances of conversion extremely general and vague. Thus, 
rather than attempting to articulate one common but overly general 
and vague definition of moral conversion, the task of circumscribing 
the notion for present purposes will be accomplished by differentiating 
three general “classes” of conversion: conversion regarding content, 
conversion regarding attitude or degree of commitment, and conversion 
regarding behavioral coherence. 
The Use of Narrative Evidence
Each of these processes entails a change profound enough and 
6 For a fuller treatment of the characterization of conversion as “existential,” see 
MacLaughlin, Narratives of Hope, 193.
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existential enough to merit the name of conversion as was indicated. 
For each category in the typology, the fact that moral conversion takes 
place in such a way needs to be established. There is no shortage of 
views, both in the spheres of common sense and philosophical reflection, 
that reject the possibility of human beings changing morally for the 
better – whether on the grounds of a pessimistic view of human nature 
that considers human beings just too strongly drawn toward selfish 
behavior, dishonesty, inauthenticity, the abuse of power, and other 
forms of behavior generally regarded as morally lacking; or whether 
on the grounds of deterministic views that consider the change itself 
to be impossible, either from the belief that moral behavior is, for good 
or ill, entirely determined by original, inherited tendencies, or from the 
belief that change becomes impossible once a person’s moral views and 
moral habits settle in, “crystallize,” so to speak. These views cannot be 
addressed directly within the scope of this paper,7 but their presence 
determines that the fact of moral conversion cannot be simply granted. 
That moral conversion actually takes place has to be proved, and this 
in turn demands a specific methodology. The problem will be addressed 
by providing, at the point in which each category is discussed, what 
is called here “narrative evidence”: evidence from real-life stories that 
exemplify and demonstrate the possibility of moral conversion in very 
diverse areas of life (political commitment, criminal rehabilitation, 
career shifts, alcoholic recovery, etc). To keep this paper to a reasonable 
size, I will only include an example or two in the discussion of each 
category; a more substantial collection of narratives is included in my 
dissertation.8
7 They are discussed in detail in MacLaughlin, Narratives of Hope, 261-327.
8 MacLaughlin, Narratives of Hope, 261-37. Because conversion is understood here 
not merely as a change in externally observable, behavioral patterns, but (as the 
typology will make it clear) more fundamentally as a change in a person’s ways of 
thinking, judging, and valuing in moral matters and also because an understanding of 
the intellectual, emotional, and volitional processes involved is sought, it is necessary 
that the narrative evidence provided goes beyond an external description of behavioral 
changes, or a statement of the observable evidence of a person’s moral convictions 
“before and after” the change takes place, and gain as much insight as possible into such 
processes. This requirement imposes the methodological need to focus on a small number 
of narratives that provide sufficiently rich descriptions, rather than to attempt a more 
extensive but “shallower” survey that could provide statistically significant data but that 
would serve little purpose for this project. In other words, the methodology employed 
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1. The Modern/ConTeMporary noTion of MoraliTy: 
Moral Conversion regarding righT and Wrong
The modern/contemporary approach to the meaning of “moral” is not 
itself devoid of ambiguity. Two approaches are commonly encountered 
when investigating this meaning. One common approach is to begin 
the discussion by asking about the meaning of “right” and “wrong,” the 
polarity most frequently associated with moral judgments. Another 
very common approach begins with a discussion on the experience of 
“oughtness,” the peculiarly human experience of regarding oneself as 
duty-bound with respect to certain courses of action; the problem, in 
other words, of moral obligation.9 The two approaches, “right/wrong” 
and “obligation,” are intrinsically bound to each other; they may or may 
not eventually be collapsed into one, leading to significant differences 
in moral theory. To simplify matters, I will consider them in a single 
category during the course of this article, and will refer to them with 
the expression “right/wrong.”
This common focus in contemporary discussion provides us with a 
first meaning for “moral conversion”: a change in the subject (or moral 
agent) with regard to her/his existential involvement in the task of 
acting rightly or wrongly, of doing what ought to be done. This change 
may involve both big, consequential decisions and the small, perhaps 
half-thought actions of daily life. In relation to this focus, it is possible to 
identify three distinct processes that can be called “moral conversion.”
A. Moral Conversion Regarding the Content of Right 
and Wrong
The first class of conversion focuses on significant changes in what 
is considered to be right/wrong in general.
It should not be difficult for the reader to recall instances of 
changing one’s moral judgment on some specific issue or other: a 
practice about which one previously had no moral objections comes 
(and the epistemological challenges it may encounter) is closer to that of the historian 
than to that of the sociologist. The preferential use of narratives of a biographical and 
autobiographical kind responds to this specific need.
9 The more classically minded reader will perhaps initiate the discussion by asking 
about what constitutes “the good life.” This approach will be taken into consideration 
later in this article.
282 MacLaughlin
to be considered objectionable, for example, in the light of such new 
information as its negative environmental impact or its exploitative 
background; or because a new argument or point of view is presented 
that one had not previously considered. Such changes in judgment 
or opinion – hopefully a normal occurrence in the moral life of an 
intellectually active person – are not what is referred to here as 
instances of moral conversion.
But one can also imagine (and perhaps recall) a change in a 
person’s moral judgment about the said practice happening due to a 
more fundamental shift in that person’s basic criteria for judging: in 
the wake of this shift, a revision of moral conclusions and previously 
accepted rules takes place. A person, for example, begins to include the 
potential environmental consequences of his/her acts as an important 
criterion for decision, when previously there was no consideration of 
the importance of this factor. This kind of change – even if the example 
chosen is relatively innocent or uncontroversial – affects the structure 
of a person’s moral judgment. Furthermore, it normally affects quite 
extensively a person’s life. A number of everyday practices and habits 
need to be changed; life requires restructuring. This restructuring 
may affect also that person’s relations, who may react positively or 
negatively to such changes, offering encourage or resistance, and overall 
expressing that the person has changed his/her value in their eyes. 
This is the kind of change that merits the name of “moral conversion.”
Alternatively, the change described may affect not just a criterion 
or set of criteria, but the entire process by which a person arrives at 
a moral judgment: the person, for example, might shift from being 
strictly rule-abiding to an outcome-focused form of compliance, and 
thus weigh his/her actions accordingly, by examining in each case the 
potential consequences of acting one way or another.10
Such is the first class of moral conversion: a change in the person’s 
criteria for moral judgment – or in the process of moral judging itself – 
so important as to expand into a significant life change. 
10 Sometimes such a change in the criteria for moral reasoning is accompanied by a 
shift of another sort: the move from a life ruled by uncritically accepted moral principles 
and/or rules, to a life in which one’s criteria for moral action are habitually reflected upon, 
weighed, and critically considered. This is what Conn calls a “critical moral conversion”: 
a moral conversion that is coupled with some degree of intellectual conversion.
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Narrative Evidence for this Class of Conversion11
An instance of moral conversion regarding content about right/
wrong is found in Donald Gelpi’s account of his own conversion from 
racism. Having been born in New Orleans, Louisiana, Gelpi avows to 
having grown up “a racial bigot,” his racism focusing on black people.
I do not remember ever doing anything to hurt black people, 
but I did grow up believing in their essential racial inferiority 
to myself and to other white people.
No one challenged my racial bigotry in a systematic way until I 
went to high school. The Jesuits who taught me waged ceaseless 
war on my racism and on the racism of my white classmates. 
I resisted them for two years, but eventually I conceded that 
they had the right of it. I recognized the immorality of racism 
and renounced it in my own heart.12
Gelpi’s account is devoid of dramatic overtones: he acknowledges 
in simple terms the fact that he essentially agreed with racist views – 
despite not having consciously hurt anyone on account of such views 
– and that in a two-year process eventually came to see such views as 
immoral and renounce them. There is clearly a significant change in the 
content of what he regarded as right/wrong, despite his having grown 
up immersed in such views, and despite the fact that his resistance to 
change was being supported by his classmates. Gelpi also identifies in 
this instance of conversion a deeper kind of change:
I look back on that experience as a personal moral conversion. 
I regard it as an initial moral conversion because, for the 
first time in my life, I took personal responsibility for my 
disagreeing with the conventional morality taught me by my 
society. By disagreeing, I took personal responsibility for my 
11 As anticipated, in order to go beyond a mere description of categories and show that 
these categories describe something that actually takes place, each section of this paper 
describing a class of conversion will be accompanied by a subsection providing narrative 
evidence. The evidence provided is drawn from a survey of biographies, interviews, 
psychological and sociological investigations, and similar sources. 
12 Donald Gelpi, The Conversion Experience: A Reflective Process for R.C.I.A. 
Participants and Others (New York: Paulist Press, 1998), 29.
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own conscience.13
This transition – in Gelpi’s words, a transition from “conventional 
to autonomous morality”14 – is an instance and an example of a shift 
in criteria for moral judgment that is accompanied and supported 
by a cognitive conversion: Gelpi experiences a shift toward a need 
for reasoned support for his moral views and practices, as opposed to 
accepting as sufficient evidence for them the fact of their widespread 
acceptance.
Robert Bellah provides another example in his interview of Wayne 
Bauer.15 Raised in an unreflective acceptance of traditional patriotic 
values, Wayne joined the Marine Corps in the sixties; but during this 
time, friends who had gone to college began to argue with him about 
the Vietnam War. These discussions went on for a few months, and 
Bauer finally concluded that his best arguments “held no weight.”16 
His resolution was strong enough, in practical terms, to lead him to go 
AWOL, thus being forced to lead an underground life for many years. 
Eventually he surrendered to the military, was spared a court martial, 
and became a political activist and an advocate for poor tenants (an 
instance of a conversion regarding content about happiness and the 
meaning of life); but this long process began in a moral conversion 
regarding content about right/wrong: he came to see joining the 
military and engaging on the military activities of the time as morally 
objectionable and acted accordingly.
These examples should suffice to indicate the reality of this class 
of conversion.
B. Moral Conversion Regarding the Degree of Commitment 
with Respect to Right/Wrong
Another class of moral conversion can be described as a shift from 
a general lack of concern for the morality of one’s actions to genuine 
concern for this. An initial way to characterize this class of moral 
13 Gelpi, The Conversion Experience, 29.
14 Gelpi, The Conversion Experience, 30.
15 Robert N. Bellah and others, Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment 
in American Life (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 17-20.
16 Bellah and others, Habits of the Heart, 17-20.
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conversion could be as a conversion “from frivolity to seriousness,” or 
“from amorality to morality.” The rules and principles that previously 
defined right and wrong for a person, and that were in all probability 
learnt in that person’s childhood, may have been up to that point 
regarded as nonbinding; perhaps as rules that, while laid down by 
society in general, are to be followed only by those obedient enough 
to abide by them. But when this class of moral conversion takes place, 
these rules and principles, previously comprehended in this detached 
manner, become now existentially pressing for the person. No longer 
are these rules something exclusively “for other people.” Nor are they 
regarded as rules that one “happens to follow” arbitrarily but are now 
followed because they are grasped as binding on all moral persons, or 
essential to the maintenance of one’s moral identity.
On closer analysis, however, the characterization of this class 
of conversion becomes more complex. To begin with, quite a bit of 
variety can be found in the shapes that this class of conversion can 
take, and some ambiguity, even controversy, in their valuation. Simone 
de Beauvoir for example, in The Ethics of Ambiguity,17 has traced a 
number of moral/existential profiles that range from the “Serious 
Man,” – a dangerous being, in her account, who takes the world to be 
the source of absolute, unconditioned values – to the “Free Man” who, 
aware of the (claimed) absence of such unconditioned values, commits 
to the existentialist ideal of the exercise of his freedom; and in so doing, 
by accepting the freedom of others as something like an absolute, 
regains a “legitimate” kind of seriousness. In her description we find a 
number of moral profiles – the “sub-men,” the Adventurer, the Nihilist, 
the Passionate Man – characterized in subtle distinctions by the ways 
in which they commit to values, including whether they regard them as 
absolute and unconditional or as something else.18
Secondly, the inverse process is also conceivable. A person who 
lived by certain rules believing that they should be followed may come 
to doubt their foundations, or their hold on him/her in terms of right/
wrong, and so become more distanced and no longer see him/herself 
17 Simone de Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity (New York: Philosophical Library, 
1949).
18 De Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity, 51. Interestingly, de Beauvoir uses the actual 
term “conversion” to describe the movement to a profile closer to the “Free Man” ideal.
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under their rule. Should this process be considered just another 
form of conversion, or perhaps a “counter-conversion,” with the same 
characteristics but an inverse moral sign? None of these alternatives 
seems to be adequate: such a process is rarely the exact inverse, for 
while the shift toward a higher degree of commitment usually entails a 
process of “positive” determination on the side of the agent, its opposite 
usually resembles rather a process of decreasing determination, dis-
integration, an “entropic” process, so to speak. Such a process fits 
neither the use of the term “conversion” in its common, everyday 
usage – so it is rarely called a conversion – nor the technical use of 
the term as developed in this work. The matter cannot be discussed 
in further detail here, since this would require a fleshed-out ethical 
theory addressing the issues of moral progress and decadence. Only the 
suggestion is made here that the matter may be usefully approached 
by examining whether the process can be categorized in terms of 
integration or disintegration.
Narrative Evidence for this Class of Conversion
Often a change in attitude will be accompanied by a change in the 
way the person perceives moral issues (i.e., content). Thus a conversion 
will be considered to fit the present class not when there is no change 
regarding content, but when, even if significant changes regarding 
content can be identified, the attitudinal change appears to be more 
significant. The well-known story of Mohandas Gandhi being forced 
out of the train may be read in this light.19 While traveling first class 
through Natal, South Africa, as representative of his Indian law firm, 
an official told him (because of his “coloured” skin) that he should move 
to third-class. When he refused, the official called a constable that then 
took him by the hand and forced him out of the train, together with 
his luggage. Gandhi then sat in the waiting room, dark and cold, and 
considered whether to fight for his rights, to continue on his journey 
without responding to the insults, or – ultimately his choice – to 
dedicate himself “to root out the disease and suffer hardships in the 
process.”20
19 M. K. Gandhi, An Autobiography; or the Story of My Experiments with Truth, trans. 
Mahadev Desai (Ahmedabad, India: Navajivan Publishing House, 1927), 103-105.
20 Gandhi, An Autobiography, 104.
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The change that Gandhi describes in his autobiography can be 
best described as a change in attitude. The injustice and the brutality of 
racism in general could hardly be something unknown to Gandhi at the 
time – he had already been involved, for example, in a similar quarrel 
regarding the use of turbans in court.21 But, even though the hardship 
he was subjected to in this episode was somewhat superficial, still 
the humiliation and shock seem to have acted as a sort of “triggering 
event,” making him reevaluate the morality of ignoring the problem 
in general, and make a commitment; that is, adopt a new attitude, a 
“committed” attitude toward its solution. Gandhi does not report a 
significant revision of his view of the morality of racism itself on his 
part (i.e., a revision of the content of his moral evaluations). Rather, 
there is a significant change in the moral weight of the obligation 
to combat structural racism: it is now perceived as an imperative (a 
personal imperative, in Gandhi’s case) that one cannot just shrug off or 
set aside for another time.
It is possible to find instances of a more general change in attitude 
toward morality in stories of people with a criminal career that 
significantly “reform.” A narrative of this kind can be found in the story 
of CeaseFire activists Antonio Pickett (“Lil’ Tony”) and Evans Robinson 
(“Chip”).22 Childhood friends, both were raised in strict homes “where 
grace was said at the dinner table and swearing was forbidden.”23 
They, however, “quickly grew enamored of the thrill and payoff of 
petty crime,” joining a gang, eventually getting into drug dealing, and 
beginning their rotation in and out of prison. By 1996, though, Tony 
found himself facing conviction, and weary of “worrying [that] the next 
person he saw might try to kill him.” While awaiting placement in a 
state prison he let his gang’s leadership know he was stepping down. 
He mentions the prayer and support of his mother, a “loving but stern 
evangelical minister,” as instrumental in his “turning his life around.” 
While he spent time in prison, his friend Chip ran wild, slowed down 
only by the tragedy of his cousin dying in a shooting.
When Tony was released, his mother connected him then with 
21 Gandhi, An Autobiography, 100.
22 Rex W. Huppke, “Four Who Watch over the City,” Chicago Tribune, December 10, 
2004.
23 Huppke, “Four Who Watch over the City.”
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CeaseFire, an initiative to take on high-risk individuals, help them find 
jobs and educational opportunities, and counsel them about the pitfalls 
of street life, and before long Tony became a counselor for CeaseFire. 
Chip became one of his first clients, taking with his help a factory job; 
and in 2002 he was also hired by CeaseFire. An article in the Chicago 
Tribune describes them as having significant street clout due to their 
criminal past, which makes them very effective in recruiting teenagers 
out of gangs. They are also described as loving their adrenaline-charged 
jobs, but also carrying the regret from having hurt people in the past 
and having influenced others to live a life of crime.24
From the information that can be gathered from this newspaper 
account, it would seem that Pickett and Robinson were not ignorant of 
the basic norms required in honest living – they would have learned 
them in their early years. Rather, they consciously disregarded them. 
Their conversion involves thus a new or renewed interest in leading an 
honest life. But while their understanding of what constitutes a honest 
life has not changed, in this case there seems to have been a change in 
their way of understanding the good of living a honest life – as, perhaps, 
free from the hazards and the weariness of a life of crime – and this 
change in their understanding may have been instrumental in their 
attitudinal change. Summing up his experience, for example, Robinson 
says: “The air smells different. The sun seems brighter. Things aren’t 
so bleak all the time.”25 His new attitude and his new understanding of 
life seem to go together.
Cases like this, though not run-of-the-mill, are not isolated cases.26 
The opposite process is described by Patrick K., a fast-track operator 
who gradually got involved in a scheme with corrupt elements of his 
state’s government. Eventually the scheme was discovered; Patrick 
24 The article also quotes a police officer, Sheila McFarland of the Harrison District, 
attesting that “the once-notorious Chip and Tony have shown they’ve changed their ways. 
‘They’ve done some things in the past that we wouldn’t be proud of, but in the same sense 
they’ve turned over a new leaf,’ she said. ‘I believe their experience out on the streets and 
interacting with gangs at one time has given them the ability to go out and communicate 
with current gang members. They’re taking these people under their wings’” (Huppke, 
“Four Who Watch over the City”). This testimony provides further evidence to assess the 
stability of their conversion.
25 Huppke, “Four Who Watch over the City.”
26 I provide a few more in the relevant sections of my dissertation. See Mac Laughlin, 
Narratives of Hope, 92.
289A Typology of Moral Conversion
managed to escape with his family and became an international 
fugitive; but eventually the stress of this fugitive life became too 
much and he turned himself in.27 He tells now the story as part of 
his community service duty. In his account, rationalization was a very 
important factor in his downfall – he spent a great deal of time devising 
ways to convince his wife and parents that what he was doing was 
ethical – and so was a feeling of invulnerability or arrogance fostered 
by his success. Interestingly enough, his body seemed to be more aware 
than his conscious mind of the trouble he was getting into: it responded 
with constant ulcers and hair loss. The dissolution is gradual and does 
not seem marked by a turning toward anything. Rather, the story 
illustrates what Lonergan called “the flight from insight,” a half-
conscious attempt to avoid looking at the issue or understanding it 
adequately. For these reasons, it seems appropriate to withhold the 
term “conversion” from this type of change.28
C. Conversion Regarding Behavioral Coherence in 
Right/Wrong
It is fairly common – perhaps, indeed, a universal element in 
human moral experience – that even people who take morality seriously, 
or have an ingrained concern for doing what is moral, do not always act 
accordingly. “I cannot even understand my own actions,” says St. Paul, 
“for I do not do what I want, but I do what I hate.”29 These occurrences, 
viewed by the actor as contrary to their best intentions of right 
behavior can sometimes be explained, when they occur occasionally, as 
accidents – due to fatigue, to strong emotions provoked by an external 
situation (fear, anger, anxiety), to distraction, to being in a hurry, and 
so forth. That is, even though one may know what is the right action, 
27 Patrick K., in a talk given on March 2005 at Loyola University, Chicago.
28 This type of “downfall” – the result of discrete, sometimes half-conscious decisions 
rather than a conscious, determined “turning” is a favorite topic of fictional narratives 
too, from crime epics such as Mario Puzzo’s The Godfather to fantastical allegories such 
as Wilde’s The Picture of Dorian Gray or Charles Williams’s Descent into Hell, to the 
social criticism of Steinbeck’s The Winter of Our Discontent. It is also the stuff classic 
tragedies are made of, from Creon in Antigone to Macbeth – a progressive loss of control, 
originated in dubious or bad decisions, that eventually ends in corrupting the character’s 
originally good (even outstanding) moral character.
29 Romans 7, 15.
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this may still require an energy or concentration not readily available, 
or perhaps a certain amount of sacrifice that seems, in the situation, 
more than the agent can muster. Overall, these faults can be and are 
commonly attributed to “human weakness,” by which is meant that 
we human beings do not operate perfectly according to the ideal, and 
that in the concrete existential situation we sometimes operate even 
further from the ideal than what we consider an acceptable standard.
Faults of this kind are commonly distinguished, however, from 
those that have become a habit, patterns of behavior through which 
we recurrently diverge from the standard: bad habits, vices, specific 
weaknesses, what is sometimes called the “dominant defect” by those 
presenting the Ignatian Spiritual Exercises, et cetera. Such habitual 
flaws can coexist with an earnest commitment to moral ideals. There is 
no direct logical correlation between a person’s commitment to moral 
ideals and that person’s capacity for self-control: one who experiences a 
strong desire to be more moral may indeed be very poor at self-control. 
A change toward greater coherence between moral standards and 
actual behavior has to be, for this reason, distinguished from a change 
in one’s degree of commitment to moral standards (i.e., the second 
class of moral conversion). The possibility for this class of conversion 
is of particular importance for the person that has maintained a high 
level of commitment for a long while but has not achieved the desired 
degree of behavioral coherence. For this person, habitual flaws may 
weigh heavily. She may come to live in a perpetual situation of partial 
resignation or despair, convinced that these flaws are unconquerable, 
or, alternatively, may have become nearly blind to them, ignoring them, 
or living with a certain amount of Sartrean “bad faith.” Yet it still may 
happen that at a certain point in life the person encounters a source of 
hope, and so engages with the conviction that it is possible to change. 
Or the person that became used to living with his/her habitual flaws, or 
is nearly blind to them, is suddenly vividly awakened to them. On the 
wings of renewed strength and/or awareness, the person may rise to 
meet the challenge and conquer these flaws, finally beginning to move 
at a steady, determined pace – sometimes at a very fast pace – toward 
the much desired, better habits.
What is achieved at the end of this transition is a more complete 
coherence between one’s moral standards and one’s patterns of behavior. 
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The key moment seems to be the original moment in which the person’s 
resolve is made (not just when it is formulated, but when it somehow 
“clicks” and transforms the whole disposition of the person toward his/
her habitual flaws). Such is the third class of moral conversion.
Narrative Evidence for this Class of Conversion
Examples of this instance of conversion abound in literature 
regarding alcoholism recovery: cases of alcoholics that have given 
up hope of ever getting rid of their addiction, that (sometimes quite 
unexpectedly) find a source of strength, hope or motivation, religious 
or otherwise, and put themselves in a successful path of recovery. 
Commonly the subjects do not consider their addiction a good thing, but 
to varying degrees a destructive one. Many suffer greatly from knowing 
this; they even feel they have excluded themselves from humanity. 
But because of the nature of addictions, often the desire to overcome 
their addiction has been stalled by the subject’s sense of inability to 
do so, the desire turning into something abstract and inoperative, so 
that its frustration adds an additional element of suffering. It is thus 
justifiable to classify a determined (and eventually successful) push to 
reach a higher behavioral coherence as a moral conversion regarding 
coherence.
The story of “Subject G,” for example, from James Leuba’s classical 
study of conversion, 30 tells about a man who became an alcoholic at the 
age of twenty-one, losing his business and two jobs because of this. The 
subject reports having signed “enough abstinence pledges to cover the 
wall of the room,” which indicates a relatively active desire/attitude 
toward recovery over the preceding years. But then, finding himself 
without money, without friends, and without a home, and practically 
wishing to die, a lady showed him sympathy and invited him to a 
mission. Her kindness made him look within. For years no one had ever 
cared about him; this unwonted kindly interest went to his heart.31
Going to this meeting, he was invited to “give himself to the Lord 
Jesus Christ with the assurance that He would save him.” He accepted 
the offer of a bed and tried to read the material given to him; he was too 
30 James H. Leuba, “A Study in the Psychology of Religious Phenomena,” The 
American Journal of Psychology 7, no. 3 (1896): 376-77.
31 Leuba, “A Study in the Psychology of Religious Phenomena,” 376-77.
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disturbed, but finally experienced peace after asking God to take him 
as he was. Three months after this conversion, at age forty, the subject 
was not only still “sober,” but he opened and began managing a mission 
himself.32
2. Moral Conversion aCCording To The ClassiCal 
noTion of MoraliTy: The QuesTion for happiness, 
eudaeMonia, or “The Meaning of life”
The three classes mentioned above would be sufficient to circumscribe 
the notion of moral conversion, if choosing or doing what is right/
avoiding what is wrong were the only relevant elements of moral 
experience. The focus on right/wrong, however, leaves out many aspects 
of moral life that can be considered essential to it. These are aspects 
that were regularly taken into account in what may be called, following 
Servais Pinckaers’s use, the “classical” notion of morality. Pinckaers 
denounces a shift in modern ethical theory toward obligation as the 
central category of ethics (what has been characterized here as the focus 
on right/wrong). 33 He contrasts this focus with the focus on happiness, 
which is, according to him, the keystone of ancient and medieval moral 
thought (as well as of the moral message of the Scriptures): this shift 
forces many of the classical themes of moral reflection to fit into the 
obligation framework, in a somewhat Procrustean way, and those that 
do not quite fit are left out, the result being a pauperization of the 
themes of moral reflection.
Of particular importance for present purposes is not to overlook 
the concern for happiness or eudaemonia that characterizes classical 
ethical theory; and, in a more contemporary formulation, the concern 
for the meaning of life. This concern is not only alive and present in 
ordinary people’s moral lives but also constitutes a recurrent theme 
32 Leuba, “A Study in the Psychology of Religious Phenomena,” 376-77.
33 Servais Pinckaers, The Sources of Christian Ethics, trans. Sr. Mary Thomas 
Noble from the 3rd ed. (Washington, DC: Catholic University of America Press, 1995). 
Pinckaers does not specify what he means by “modern”; but it may be inferred that he 
refers to a tendency that had its roots in some Renaissance thinkers and culminated 
in the Enlightenment, its paradigmatic expression being Kant’s moral treatises. This 
focus on obligation was carried on, mostly unchallenged, into twentieth-century ethical 
theories; for this reason it may better be called “modern/contemporary.”
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in many stories of moral conversion. Integrating these themes in 
the present typology will lead us to an alternative, expanded set of 
scenarios that are also instances of moral conversion.34
A. Conversion Regarding Content about Happiness/ 
Eudaemonia/Meaning
Take as a starting point a common form of the question about 
eudaemonia, “what would make me truly happy?” Insofar as the 
question is taken with a certain degree of seriousness, a change in the 
habitually given answer (or even the suspicion that the answer given 
habitually may be wrong) can precipitate existential life-changes, that 
is, moral conversion. Conversion would take place when a person shifts 
from looking for happiness/eudaemonia/meaning in one “category of 
goals” to looking for it in a very different category (e.g., moving from 
career-related achievements to fulfillment in the service of those in 
need). To be considered moral conversion, however, that which is 
changed for something else must have been something that habitually 
constituted a “central focus” in the life of that person, or in other words, 
it must be in that specific good or category of goals in which the hopes 
for happiness are placed.35 When this “central focus” shifts one can 
expect changes deep and overhauling, possibly entailing a substantial 
rescheduling of the person’s resources, time commitments, and so forth, 
and more importantly, a restructuring of that person’s priorities and 
values. Career changes usually involve this class of conversion, when 
a rethinking of one’s life’s goals is involved. Religious conversion often 
also involves this class of conversion, both in terms of the life-meaning 
that a religion can give, and in the more specific terms of the vocational 
calling that often accompanies a strong religious experience. A person’s 
34 In calling this notion of morality “classical,” I subscribe to Pinckaers’s denomination 
out of convenience; for it may be argued that the expanded notion of “what is a matter 
of moral concern” is not specific of “classical” (i.e., Western, ancient, and medieval) 
philosophy; but Pinckaers’s denomination greatly simplifies the exposition.
35 This idea appears in William James’s analysis of religious conversion: “To say that 
a man is ‘converted’ means, in these terms, that religious ideas, previously peripheral in 
his consciousness, now take a central place, and that religious aims form the habitual 
centre of his energy.” William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience; a Study in 
Human Nature: Being the Gifford Lectures on Natural Religion Delivered at Edinburgh 
in 1901-1902 (New York: Mentor Books, 1958), 162.
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turning from a life of addiction or crime may also involve it, perhaps 
because the newly acquired sense of freedom demands of the person an 
expansive development in the new direction.36
Narrative Evidence for This Class of Conversion
Some of the narratives considered previously have sufficient 
elements of this type of conversion to be revisited here. Gandhi’s story, 
for example: his decision not to shrug off the abuses of institutional 
racism but to actively combat it would lead him into an extraordinary 
kind of life, very different from the regular life of a barrister that he 
had previously envisioned. Gandhi changed his priorities and life 
goals quite sharply as the result of what he saw as a personal moral 
imperative. In a similar fashion, some of the converted alcoholics 
described by Leuba found a meaning-giving function as a result of their 
conversion regarding right/wrong: “Subject G,” founded and managed 
a mission; John B. Gough became a “temperance orator.”37 Similarly, 
“Chip” and “Lil’ Tony” became CeaseFire workers. This pattern is quite 
significant; it suggests, among other things, a strong link between moral 
conversion regarding right/wrong, and an openness to finding meaning 
for life in responding to one’s community’s needs and ailments.
In a study of individualism in the United States, Robert Bellah has 
documented a few instances of this class of conversion in quite some 
detail. The case of Brian Palmer illustrates a shift from a “utilitarian 
individualism” to an “expressive individualism.” In the interview, 
Palmer recalls “a considerable devotion to making money” at the root 
of his “utilitarian individualism.”
36 There is also the possibility of a change, not in the answer given to the question, but 
of a change in the question itself. Whatever answer is given for example to the question, 
“what would make me truly happy?” might never completely dispel the originally 
individualistic focus of the question, and thus one might consider the possibility that 
the question is wrongly formulated; that an excessive focus on what makes “me” happy 
(what Bellah calls, in Habits of the Heart, the “therapeutic attitude”) will only yield 
dissatisfaction or disappointment, and that therefore the only way to find an answer to 
the question about eudaemonia is by abandoning that formulation of the question, and 
asking something else. Or alternatively the question about happiness may be entirely 
pushed out of the way by the existential situation: a matter of duty may take priority 
over questions of personal happiness. When such is the case, the expression “meaning of 
life” may be better suited to describe this class of conversion.
37 Leuba, “A Study in the Psychology of Religious Phenomena,” 343-44.
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Whether or not Brian felt his life was satisfying, he was 
deeply committed to succeeding at his career and family 
responsibilities. He held two full-time jobs to support his family, 
accepting apparently without complaint the loss of a youth in 
which, he himself reports, “the vast majority of my time…was 
devoted to giving myself pleasure of one sort of another.”38
Palmer put extremely long hours at work, not questioning his 
commitment, which just “seemed like the thing to do at the time.” 
But he neglected sharing his time with his wife and children. His 
wife divorcing him came as quite a surprise, and this led Palmer “to 
reassess his life in fundamental ways and to explore the limits of the 
kind of success he had been pursuing.” In this process of reassessment, 
he reencountered such pleasures as reading and listening to music. 
The children chose to stay with him, which also forced him to shift his 
sense of himself and his priorities. A “compulsive problem solver” by 
his own definition, Brian reexamined “where the thing broke down” 
and found that he was operating as if a certain value was of the utmost 
importance to me. Perhaps it was success. Perhaps it was fear of failure, 
but I was extremely success-oriented, to the point where everything 
would be sacrificed for the job, the career, the company. I said bullshit. 
That ain’t the way it should be.39
With this new outlook about the content of what should be striven 
for, Brian married a divorcee his age, with four children herself, and 
discovered by his own account “a new sense of himself” and of “what 
love can be,” “almost a psychologically buoyant feeling of being able to 
be so much more involved and sharing.”40 He also found out that he 
could “get a lot of personal reward from being involved in the lives of 
my children.”41 As Bellah puts it, “the revolution in Brian’s thinking 
came from a reexamination of the true sources of joy and satisfaction 
in his life.” 42
38 Bellah and others, Habits of the Heart, 3.
39 Bellah and others, Habits of the Heart, 5.
40 Bellah and others, Habits of the Heart, 5.
41 Bellah and others, Habits of the Heart, 6.
42 Bellah and others, Habits of the Heart, 6.
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B. Conversion Regarding Attitude Toward Happiness/ 
Eudaemonia/Meaning
The preceding class of moral conversion commonly entails that the 
agent is, with some degree of awareness, already involved in some kind 
of meaning-seeking process. The present section considers a class of 
moral conversion that can take place when a meaning-seeking process 
is not actively operative: moral conversion as the process through 
which a person is “awakened” to meaning and becomes involved in a 
meaning-seeking process. It considers what changes may take place 
regarding the attitude with which the effort to achieve happiness/
eudaemonia/ meaning is (or is not) undertaken.
A person’s attitude in this regard may range from deep involvement 
(both in the effort to clarify the content of these goals, and to attain 
them), to utter indifference to the problem, and even to denying 
that there is a question. As with conversion regarding commitment 
about right/wrong, there are strong reasons to argue that there is a 
normative direction for this class of conversion, the ideal being the 
person who applies his/her conscious faculties explicitly to discerning 
the content of happiness/eudaemonia/meaning in their own lives. The 
well-known phrase attributed to Socrates, “the unexamined life is not 
worth living,” declares this well enough, and often philosophers have 
interpreted their “gadfly” task as that of denouncing when the social 
environment makes it too difficult to achieve this discernment. Thus 
Josef Pieper denounced the creation of a “world of labor,” an existence 
devoid of the possibility of philosophical leisure, absolutely oriented 
toward production;43 Simone de Beauvoir identified a variety of human 
types according to their relation to meaning (the poorest existence 
being that of the “sub-man,” whose life is almost bare facticity, the 
poverty of his project making his world insignificant and dull);44 and 
Lonergan himself identified the figure of the “drifter,” who does nothing 
very deliberately and who is so lacking in reflective awareness that one 
may be tempted to ask whether such a life can be called “moral” (or 
“immoral”) at all.45
43 Josef Pieper, Leisure, the Basis of Culture, trans. Gerald Malsbary (South Bend, IN: 
St. Augustine’s Press, 1998), 39-48.
44 De Beauvoir, The Ethics of Ambiguity, 42.
45 Bernard Lonergan, Collection (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967), 242. Also 
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Instances of people living “unexamined lives” or “drifting” are 
rather common. But if it is true that human beings are at their core 
directed toward happiness, eudaemonia, or meaning, and if such a 
quality has not been permanently expunged or drowned by habit, then 
the question for “what is the meaning of it all” may yet be reawakened. 
When this happens – when a person changes his/her attitude so that 
the content of happiness/ eudaemonia/meaning becomes a pressing 
question, and its specific achievement is at the center of that person’s 
efforts and energy, we are in the presence of a moral conversion 
regarding attitude toward happiness/eudaemonia/ meaning.46
Narrative Evidence for this Class of Conversion
Ira Byock, a hospice doctor who specializes in palliative medicine, 
and is active in the hospice movement, tells the story of Marie Allen,47 a 
middle-aged woman who was dealt many bad hands, including finding 
out that her sister Kathy had had an affair with her husband, after 
which Marie divorced him and broke relations with her sister. Marie 
then remarried her ex-husband after fifteen years of separation; but 
her husband died briefly after their second marriage. Shortly after this, 
Marie learned from her doctor that she had colon cancer in its terminal 
stages and a very short time to live. While this revelation could have 
been an occasion for despair, Marie overcame her initial shock quickly 
and pragmatically; she contacted her sister, and the bad news became 
an opportunity to heal their relationship. Kathy received Marie in 
her house and cared for her lovingly during her last year, adapting 
her life to the needs of Marie’s palliative treatment. Marie’s relation 
with Kathy continued to be a little stiff until, finding out from Kathy 
that her late husband had been actually two-timing both sisters, her 
Conn, Christian Conversion, 115.
46 As to the possibility of shifting away from an attitude of actively seeking meaning/
eudaemonia, this may not, despite philosophers’ concerns, be a bad thing in all cases: 
some people may enjoy routine, at least if it is not of a dehumanizing kind, and some 
people, who suffer from actually being too reflective, may benefit from it. But insofar as it 
involves a mindless, unintentional drifting this process is not properly described by the 
term “conversion,” which implies some active endeavor on the part of the moral agent, a 
higher integration of some sort, and not merely the decreasing directedness of “drifting.”
47 Ira Byock, Dying Well: Peace and Possibilities at the End of Life (New York: 
Riverhead Books, 1997), 35-57. The names have been changed by Byock.
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resentment dissolved in shared laughter. Marie also recomposed her 
relationship with her estranged daughter Cindy, and her goal became 
to endure until Cindy’s upcoming wedding. Shortly after a year of being 
diagnosed, Marie died, without pain, and in the care and company of 
her family.
There seems to be in Marie, before the diagnosis, a general lack 
of authentic purpose: she lives in resentment, estranged from her 
loved ones, and seems to fill these gaps in her life by treating herself to 
material trinkets (she owned a very large collection of shoes, that she 
gave away without a second thought after the decision was made to 
live at Kathy’s). There does not seem to be an examined choice here. By 
contrast, once she finds out that she has little time left, she quickly takes 
the matter into her hands, gives away those things that are not really 
important to her, and focuses, with a very practical mind-set, on her 
goal of making of her last moments a time for healing and cultivating 
her relations with her loved ones. There is a general and rather swift 
change, first, in her attitude toward happiness in general: rather than 
lingering in her resentment and adding to it negative feelings provoked 
by this last revelation, she puts her energy in cultivating positive, 
loving relations. And secondly, helped by the hospice staff she examines 
and articulates her concrete goals (e.g., enduring until her daughter’s 
wedding), a move that implies some degree of examination of what she 
considers meaningful to her life at that stage. In short, Marie converted 
from an attitude of acid pessimism and lingering resentment to life 
in general, to an attitude of cherishing life, letting go of grudges and 
actively seeking “happiness,” which for her meant dying in peace after 
having reconstructed loving relations with the remaining members of 
her family.
Brian Palmer’s story, considered in the previous section, also reveals 
attitudinal changes.48 Palmer’s original “utilitarian individualism” 
seems to have been espoused, to a great degree, unreflectively. There 
is something paradoxical perhaps (but not uncommon) in the way 
in which this energetic, goal-driven “problem solver” lived for a long 
period of time devoid of authentic purpose. The shock and forlornness 
that followed his divorce provided the setting and the motivation for a 
conscious examination of his life goals. Not only did he change his goals, 
48 Bellah and others, Habits of the Heart, 3-8.
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but he also adopted a different attitude toward happiness/eudaemonia/
meaning, as something deserving explicit examination.
C. Conversion Regarding Coherence in the Search for 
Eudaemonia
It was noted above (in Section 1.C), when describing moral 
conversion regarding behavioral coherence about right/wrong, that 
the fact that a person holds certain moral criteria and principles does 
not guarantee that a person’s actions will conform to such principles, 
particularly when they clash with the immediateness of short-term 
satisfaction. Similarly, even though a person may clearly appreciate 
that a certain course of action would be beneficial with respect to his/
her quest for eudaemonia, or more in tune with what is regarded by 
this person as meaning-giving, the person may still choose to follow 
a different course of action; or alternatively, perceive him/herself as 
powerless to choose or engage in the course of action that is understood 
as the more appropriate to achieve happiness/eudaemonia/meaning. 
Classical sources interpret such failures as the result of an 
internal division in the person’s operative principles. Plato described 
this internal division with the vivid image of a many-headed beast, in 
which all heads seek at the same time to be fed by a sometimes strong, 
sometimes weak, human head, representative of reason.49 Aristotle 
gave this phenomenon a detailed treatment in his Nicomachean 
Ethics, describing “moral weakness” as a disconnection between 
what the person regards as the rational way to act, and that person’s 
actions.50 Sometimes this is the effect of a disconnection between 
different types of knowledge (i.e., we may know the general rule and 
not apply it to the concrete situation at hand), and sometimes the effect 
of the person’s knowledge being rendered ineffective by reason of the 
person being in the grip of his/her emotions – a condition compared to 
those of being asleep, mad, or drunk.51 Because of this potential for an 
internal division/disconnection, sporadic acts of “moral weakness” can 
be considered a normal part of human life. But it may happen that 
these inconsistencies become habitual; furthermore, they may become 
49 Republic, book IX, 588b-592.
50 Nicomachean Ethics, VII, 1 (1145b).
51 Nicomachean Ethics, VII, 3 (1146b-1147a).
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so resistant to change, so recurrent, that overcoming them in a stable 
and definitive way comes to be perceived by the person as being beyond 
their capacities and resources, even if there is clarity in the person’s 
mind regarding the content of happiness/ eudaemonia/meaning. The 
content is perceived as essentially unattainable, not because of external 
conditions, but because of one’s own weaknesses or insufficiency. The 
result is loss of hope, despair, defeat. 
This is the setting for the third class of moral conversion. 
Conversion at this point appears as an infusion of new strength, new 
enthusiasm, new operative hope, on the wings of which the person is 
able to overcome effectively the obstacles and contrary habits that 
weighed him/her down, and engage in – and eventually consolidate – 
patterns of behavior that are consistent with what is regarded as the 
proper direction toward happiness/eudaemonia/meaning.
Narrative Evidence for this Class of Conversion
Here also many stories may be gathered from the context of 
addiction and recovery. Leuba’s “Subject E,” for example, declares:
…all my pangs were due to some terrible remorse I used to 
feel after a heavy carousal, the remorse taking the shape of 
regret after my folly in wasting my life in such a way – a man of 
superior talents and education. I was not much alarmed about 
the future world.52
And John B. Gough, also mentioned by Leuba, says of a person in 
his situation:
The sense of his degradation and worthlessness does not involve 
in his mind responsibility for his sin to other; he is absorbed in 
his own self. He battles against himself, poor slave and outlaw, 
to conquer, if possible, the place he has lost in society.53
The theme of happiness/eudaemonia/meaning appears clearly in 
these two accounts. More recent narratives of a similar sort can be found 
in the collection of stories that Alcoholics Anonymous publishes in its 
52 Leuba, “A Study in the Psychology of Religious Phenomena,” 373-76 (emphasis 
mine).
53 Leuba, “A Study in the Psychology of Religious Phenomena,” 343.
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“Big Book.”54 One of the earliest narratives of this constantly renewed 
text is that of “Doctor Bob,” one of A.A.’s cofounders.55 Doctor Bob got 
into drinking during his college years; by the time he took up medicine, 
he was drinking enough to have morning “jitters.” His addiction 
compromised already his ability in class, and in the sophomore year he 
almost quit school. He had to convince the faculty to let him take his 
exams (he had turned in examination books empty because he could 
not hold a pencil), passed them, then remained sober during a couple 
years of residency during which he was too busy to leave the hospital 
frequently. Soon after he got his own practice he fell into drinking 
again; he even developed a phobia to running out of liquor.56 He had to 
manage his addiction carefully – he needed to be sober enough in the 
morning to practice medicine, in order to have money for liquor in the 
evening. He developed tremendous cunning for acquiring and keeping 
alcohol at home, even during the times of prohibition and living with 
a vigilant wife.
It is significant that, in Bob’s narrative, drinking itself is never 
specifically censured in terms of right/wrong, whether from a religious 
or a social point of view. Rather, drinking is mentioned as a continuous 
obstacle to his fulfilling his aspirations, the cause of many miserable 
moments, and of living under the constant threat of downfall and shame. 
This focus places his narrative within the happiness/eudaemonia/
meaning theme. Indeed, it is a focus on happiness – here emphasizing 
the aspect of “living a free life” – that reignites in Doctor Bob a strong 
desire to recover: a moral conversion regarding attitude, but one that 
does not become immediately effective, and thus requires a conversion 
regarding coherence as an additional step. Says Doctor Bob:
About the time of the beer experiment [a catastrophic attempt 
to replace stronger drinks with beer] I was thrown in with a 
crowd of people who attracted me because of their seeming 
poise, health and happiness. They spoke with great freedom 
from embarrassment, which I could never do, and they seemed 
54 Alcoholics Anonymous: The Story of How Many Thousands of Men and Women Have 
Recovered from Alcoholism (Online Edition), 4th ed. (New York: Alcoholics Anonymous 
World Services, 2001).
55 Alcoholics Anonymous, 171.
56 Alcoholics Anonymous, 176.
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very much at ease on all occasions and appeared very healthy. 
More than these attributes, they seemed to be happy. I was self 
conscious and ill at ease most of the time, my health was at 
the breaking point, and I was thoroughly miserable. I sensed 
they had something I did not have, from which I might readily 
profit. I learned that it was something of a spiritual nature, 
which did not appeal to me very much, but I thought it could 
do no harm. I gave the matter much time and study for the 
next two and a half years, but I still got tight [i.e., drunk] every 
night nevertheless. I read everything I could find, and talked to 
everyone who I thought knew anything about it.57
It was about this time that an unnamed man was recommended 
to him, and after some long talks managed to get Bob to remain sober 
for a few weeks. He had a heavy fallback during a conference, but 
this person again took care of him, and Doctor Bob was able to cease 
drinking permanently, eventually regaining both his health and self-
respect, and the respect of his colleagues. Bob asks himself the question, 
what did this man do or say that was different from what others had 
done or said? In his opinion, a key factor seems to be the fact that this 
man had been an alcoholic too and had had “most of all the drunkard’s 
experiences known to man, but had been cured by the very means I had 
been trying to employ, that is to say the spiritual approach.”58
The current edition of the A.A. book features forty-two selected 
stories of recovered alcoholics, many similar in essence to the story 
of Dr. Bob above. The success of the A.A. “12-step method” suggests 
that the possibility for this type of conversion is not extremely remote 
or rare: a mere four years after the first Alcoholics Anonymous began 
meeting, they counted over 100 ex-alcoholics who had recovered using 
their method; and 100,000 worldwide in 1950 – that is, eleven years 
afterward. Today A.A. claims over 2 million members worldwide, at 
different stages of recovery.59 For the purposes of providing evidence 
for this class of conversion, this should be sufficient. 
57 Alcoholics Anonymous, 178.
58 Alcoholics Anonymous, 180.
59 A.A. Fact File, Prepared by General Service Office of Alcoholics Anonymous (New 
York: Alcoholics Anonymous World Services Inc., 1998), 16-17.
303A Typology of Moral Conversion
Conclusion: A Definition of “Moral Conversion”
In this paper I have offered a tripartite classification of instances 
of moral conversion, a classification that applies to moral conversion 
understood both in terms of right/wrong and in terms of happiness/
eudaemonia/meaning of life. For each class of conversion, a few 
narratives have been presented, with the double purpose of presenting 
evidence that such a class of conversion actually takes place, and 
illustrating with examples what is meant by each class of conversion. 
On the basis of the foregoing considerations, a general notion 
of moral conversion can now be offered. Moral conversion is a 
process in which a person changes in existential ways related to their 
understanding of their attitude toward and/or their behavioral habits 
regarding right/wrong and/or happiness/eudaemonia/meaning of 
life. The term “existential” is here especially important as denoting the 
importance of the change, that it is change involving human persons 
(though by analogy it may also apply to groups), and that it is real, 
concrete change, involving a great degree of contingency, both because 
of its concreteness and because of its apparent connection to human 
freedom.
This categorization, and the tentative definition provided here, 
are starting points for an in-depth analysis of moral conversion 
and its implications. How is moral conversion related to a normal 
process of moral development, to religious conversion, to the goals of 
psychological therapeutic practice? What philosophical implications 
follow from characterizing moral conversion as “existential change”? 
What can be established from the fact of moral conversion with regard 
to the problem of human freedom? What light does an analysis of the 
process of moral conversion throw into the discussion regarding the 
rationality of moral structures and the problem of moral motivation? 
These are some of these questions that I have addressed in length in 
my dissertation and that will hopefully become the subject of future 
articles.

